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It seems to be a common belief that in the future, 
if not in the present, digital computers are going to 
be capable of cognitive states, experiences, and con-
sciousness equal in every respect to that which exists 
in human beings. 1 Not everyone, however, is so 
optimistic. One such skeptic is John Searle and his 
"Minds, Brains, and Programs" 2 represents a direct con-
frontation between the skeptic and the proponents of 
machine intelligence. 
In MBP, Searle presents and then attempts to refute 
the thesis underlying the research of workers in strong 
AI (Artificial Intelligence). He then presents what 
can be called his own "positive" view concerning the 
problem of achieving cognitive states and what sorts of 
entities can achieve them. The goals of this discus-
sion are to: 1) briefly consider Searle's view on what 
cognitive states are not (with a focus on understand-
ing), i.e., the refutation of the strong AI thesis, 2) 
present in as much detail as possible Searle's positive 
view on cognitive states which turns on the notion of 
"causal powers of the brain," 3) examine what, if any, 
relevant differences exist between the position of 
strong AI and Searle's positive view. Once these three 
goals are met, I hope to conclude that strong AI has 
been conclusively refuted, that Searle's positive view 
is both explicable and plausible, and therefore, that 
(in light of the refutation of strong AI) it is more 
reasonable to accept Searle's view than to suspend 
judgment. 
I 
THE REFUTATION OF STRONG AI 
In his book review "The Myth of the Computer" 1 
Searle presents the following argument as a summary of 
his position against strong AI. 
1. Brain processes cause mental phenomena. 
2. Mental states are caused by and realized in the 
structure of the brain. 
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So, 3. Any system that produces mental states must have 
(causal) powers equivalent to those of the human 
brain. 
4. Digital computer programs by themselves are 
never sufficient to produce mental states. 
So, 5. The way the brain produces a mind cannot be by 
simply instantiating a computer program. 
So, 6. If you want to build a machine to produce mental 
states, then it cannot be designed to do so 
solely in virtue of its instantiating a certain 
computer program. 
I think that this argument is both valid and sound. 
Premises one and two seem incontrovertibly true. 
Searle's arguments in MBP are intended to establish the 
truth of step four in the above argument and I think 
they succeed. In order to more fully understand 
Searle's positive view, however, I will briefly address 
the salient points of the refutation of strong AI. 
The focal point of the debate in question is 
whether computers can ever achieve cognitive states 
strictly in virtue of their programs. That is, can a 
computer achieve any intentional state merely by appro-
priate programming? The strong AI researcher's claim 
is yes, and Searle's claim is no. An intentional state 
of mind is a state that can be described with sentences 
beginning with "I believe that," "I understand," "I 
desire that," etc. They are states of mind that are 
described by Searle as representing objects and states 
of affairs.* In this discussion, as mentioned earlier, 
the intentional state being considered is that of 
understanding. The question to be answered is, in vir-
tue of what is the brain the focus of intentionality? 
Searle and his opponents agree that the brain is the 
part of the human anatomy that is the source or focus 
of intentional states, but they disagree about what 
characteristic of the brain it is that allows it to 
fulfill this function. 
The claim of the researchers in strong AI is that 
the brain is the focus of intentionality in virtue of 
the programs it realizes. Therefore, anything that can 
instantiate a program can achieve intentional states. 
Consequently, computers, in virtue of their ability to 
instantiate programs, can achieve cognitive states. It 
should be noted that for the purposes of this discus-
sion, a computer is defined as any thing or collection 
of things that is stable enough and complex enough to 
accurately instantiate a program. This could be an 
anthill, some toilet paper and stones, an IBM 360, or a 
collection of beer cans. All of these things (and many 
others as well) are, or could be made, complex enough 
to instantiate a variety of computer programs since all 
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that is needed is a structure capable of maintaining 
certain relationships for an extended period of time. 
The thesis of strong AI, then, is that: 1) appropri-
ately programmed computers literally have cognitive 
states, and 2) the programs thereby explain human cog-
nitive states. To use the language of dualism, the 
strong AI researcher wants to claim that mind is to 
brain as program is to hardware, i.e., in both rela-
tions the former is independent of the latter although 
the latter is needed to instantiate the former. 
Searle refers to one of the examples used in strong 
AI to clarify this thesis. The example is from Schank 
and Abelson's Scripts Plans Goals and Understanding.* 
Schank and Abelson develop several programs that fit 
into the following scenario. 
1. The computer is given representative knowledge 
(a script) intended to be equivalent to what a 
normal human being would know about the situa-
tion in question, e.g., eating in a restaurant. 
2. The computer is then given a story about a par-
ticular situation, e.g., John ordering a ham-
burger. 
3. The computer is then "asked" questions about the 
story. These questions commonly refer to things 
not explicitly stated in the story but which 
could be derived from the story by anyone 
(anything) with basic knowledge about restau-
rants. 
4. The computer then answers these questions in a 
manner we would expect from a human being in 
similar circumstances. 
From this Searle claims (and rightly so) that the sup-
porters of strong AI draw the following conclusions: 
1) that the machine can literally be said to understand 
the story and provide answers to the questions, and 2) 
that what the machine and its programs do explains the 
human ability to understand the story and answer 
questions about it. 
From this we can extract a clear and basic thesis 
indicative of strong AI for the intentional state of, 
in this case, understanding a natural language. Such a 
thesis is: S understands P in the case where, given P 
as input, S realizes a program X which enables S to 
produce responses which are absolutely indistinguisha-
ble from that of a native speaker of the language to 
which P belongs. Therefore, according to strong AI, 
the intentional state of understanding all or part of a 
natural language is achieved when the appropriate pro-
gram is realized. In other words, S's realizing a pro-
gram X is sufficient for S to uunderstand P. In this 
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case, the computer program X would have to be such that 
given P, plus other linguistic data, S could appear to 
any questioner as indistinguishable from a native 
speaker of P, i.e., pass the Turing test.' 
To address these claims, Searle notes that "(o]ne 
way to test any theory of the mind is to ask oneself 
what it would be like if my mind actually worked on the 
principles that the theory says all minds work on." 7 
To do this, Searle introduces a series of thought-
experiments that are intended to operate on the prin-
ciples of strong AI, and to show that the claims of 
strong AI are totally unfounded. Consider the follow-
ing situation. 
Now suppose that I, who understand no Chinese at 
all and can't even distinguish Chinese symbols 
from some other kinds of symbols, am locked in a 
room with a number of cardboard boxes full of 
Chinese symbols. Suppose that I am given a book 
of rules in English that instruct me how to 
match these Chinese symbols with each other. 
The rules say such things as that the "squiggle-
squiggle" sign is to be followed by the 
"squoggle-squoggle" sign. Suppose that people 
outside the room pass in more Chinese symbols 
and that following the instructions in the book 
I pass Chinese symbols back to them. Suppose 
that unknown to me the people who pass me the 
symbols call them "questions," and the book of 
instructions that I work from they call the 
"program"; the symbols I give back to them they 
call "answers to the questions" and me they call 
"the computer." Suppose that after a while the 
programmers get so good at writing the programs 
and I get so good at manipulating the symbols 
that my answers are indistinguishable from those 
of native Chinese speakers. I can pass the 
Turing test for understanding Chinese. But all 
the same I still don't understand a word of 
Chinese and neither does any other digital com-
puter because all the computer has is what I 
have: a formal program that attaches no mean-
ing, interpretation, or content to any of the 
symbols.' 
This thought-experiment has given Searle-in-the-
Chinese-room (hereafter referred to as Searle's demon 
after Haugeland in the commentaries on Searle in BBS) 
everything that Schank and Abelson's computer has, a 
script, a story, questions, a program, and Searle's 
demon does the same thing the computer does—gives back 
answers in the same language. Furthermore, there are 
no constraints placed on Searle's demon in this 
thought-experiment. He can be super-fast, super-
intelligent, super-small, whatever is necessary, since 
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these physical characteristics should in no way impare 
or increase his ability to understand. In this way, 
Searle's demon can respond as fast or as slow as either 
a human being or a computer of any design. And since 
Searle's demon can in every way represent the perspec-
tive of the computer when operating on the Chinese sym-
bols, Searle draws the following two conclusions about 
strong AI. 
1) The computer plus program as represented by 
Searle's demon plus the instruction book does 
not understand anything. His inputs and outputs 
are identical to those of a native Chinese 
speaker but it is clear that Searle's demon does 
not understand a word of Chinese. Therefore, no 
computer, however programmed, is capable of any 
understanding of any stories in any language, 
solely in virtue of its programming. 
2) Since the computer does not actually understand 
anything, it cannot be an explanation of any 
human cognitive state. Although it may describe 
a part of what human cognition is like, the com-
puter plus program does not serve to explain 
anything, since it understands nothing. 
The basic point being made by Searle in these con-
clusions is that the computer plus program cannot un-
derstand anything strictly in virtue of its program, 
because all this amounts to is giving the computer 
"syntax" but no "semantics.11 As Searle notes, 
The computer attaches no meaning, interpretation, 
or content to the formal symbols, and qua com-
puter it couldn't, because if we tried to give 
the computer an interpretation of its symbols 
(semantics) we could only give it more uninter-
preted symbols. The computer manipulates formal 
symbols but attaches no meaning to them . . . . 9 
This is the point made by Searle's demon: he manipu-
lates the formal Chinese symbols, but he doesn't under-
stand them because they have, for Searle's demon, no 
meaning. And for the supporters of strong AI who wish 
to claim that even if the Chinese symbols are not un-
derstood, the symbolism internal to the machine (the 
machine language, i.e., Searle's demon's ability to un-
derstand the English instruction book) is understood, 
John Heil has a response in "Does Cognitive Psychology 
Rest on a Mistake?" that appears consistent with 
Searle's position. 
It appears, for example, that the sense in which 
we might want to say that the internal 'machine 
language' of a digital computer is symbolic--the 
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sense, that is, in which it could be said to have 
meaning (semantics)—is parasitic on its relation 
to a suitable programming language, and the sense 
of this language, in turn, dependent on its ap-
plication by a suitable, language using program-
mer. The programmer provides an essential link 
between the states of the machine and the states 
of affairs in the world to which the former 
•refer' . 1 0 
This relationship between program and programmer 
can also be used to explain why programmers and 
researchers in strong AI describe their machines as 
having intentional states. It is due to the fact that 
it is obvious to the programmers that the machine has 
all the necessary information to arrive at the correct 
answers to their questions. They do not pause to con-
sider that the replies of the computer have no meaning 
as far as the computer is concerned, but are being in-
terpreted as meaningful by the programmers themselves. 
This is the distinction that Searle draws between 
"intrinsic" intentionality and "observer-relative" in-
tentionality. 
. . . we need to distinguish carefully between 
cases of what I call intrinsic intentionality, 
which are cases of actual mental states, and what 
I call observer-relative ascriptions of inten-
tionality, which are ways people have of speaking 
about entities figuring in our activities but 
lacking intrinsic intentionality. 1 1 
The researchers in strong AI interpret their input into 
the computer (scripts, stories, and questions) as hav-
ing meaning, and they ascribe intrinsic intentionality 
to the computer. But the case of Searle's demon illus-
trates that all that really obtains is observer-
relative intentionality. The computer cannot and does 
not have intentional states (understanding) strictly in 
virtue of its program. It has nothing but a bunch of 
uninterpreted formal symbols and instructions as to how 
to manipulate symbols, i.e., a syntax but no semantics. 
Searle goes on to consider a series of possible 
replies to his critique of strong AI. For the specif-
ics the reader is referred to MBP. In all of the 
replies addressed, Searle can accomodate the modified 
situation into the Searle's demon thought-experiment. 1 2 
In all of the replies, Searle's demon could run the 
whole operation and not understand anything. We would 
certainly want to ascribe intentional states to such 
unified entities that some of the replies suggest, but 
it would be a case of observer-relative intentionality. 
As before, we would realize upon a close examination 
that Searle's demon is merely processing uninterpreted 
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symbols and, once again, he has syntax, but still no 
semantics. 
A close examination of Searle's response to the 
various replies reveals the following conclusions: 
1) The strong AI thesis does not offer the suffi-
cient condition for understanding that it 
claimed to offer. At best, it is a qualified 
sufficient condition and it may not even be a 
necessary condition. 
2) Because the thesis of the Combination Reply (as 
well as some of the other replies) is a brain 
simulation thesis, the philosophically interest-
ing aspect of the intitial thesis, i.e., mind as 
independent of brain characteristics, has been 
sacraficed. 
3) Therefore, digital computer programs by them-
selves are never sufficient to produce mental 
states (premise four of the main argument). 
II 
THE CAUSAL POWERS OF THE BRAIN 
Since Searle does not come out and explicitly pre-
sent his own view of intentional states, I will offer a 
version that Searle could accept based on what he does 
say. If Searle ever really presents his own thesis, it 
seems to be "that intentional states processes, and 
events are precisely that: states, processes, and 
events. The point is that they are both caused by and 
realized in the structure of the brain." 1 1 Also, 
"(m)ental states and processes, e.g., feeling thirsty 
or having a visual experience, are both caused by and 
realized in the neurophysiology of the brain. M l* 
Finally, "I believe that everything we have learned 
about human and animal biology suggests that what we 
call 'mental' phenomena are as much a part of our bi-
ological natural history as any other biological pheno-
mena . . . ."*• The reason that Searle adopts this 
position (unclear as it may be at this point) is that 
he cannot understand why anyone would accept that "of 
all the known types of specifically biological proces-
ses, one and only one type is (taken to be) completely 
independent of the biochemistry of its origins, and 
that one is cognition." 1' This is a form of the strong 
AI thesis and Searle has already disposed of this as a 
viable thesis. 
Searle'8 own view turns on the notion of "causal 
powers of the brain," and on the intrinsic/observer-
relative distinction in the ascription of intentional-
ity. Searle notes that although we may not know how 
the brain causes or accounts for mental phenomena, we 
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do know that its internal operations are causally suf-
ficient for these mental phenomena. "On my view it it 
just a plain (testable, empirical) fact about the world 
that it contains certain biological systems, specifi-
cally human and certain animal brains, that are capable 
of causing mental phenomena with intentional or seman-
tic content." 1 7 Searle also distinguishes between the 
internal causes of the brain, and the impact of the ex-
ternal world. We can actually see a tree or we can 
hallucinate the sight of a tree. Although the external 
effects on the brain are different, i.e., the former 
involves the external world while the latter may in-
volve a drug or other neural stimulator, the internal 
mental states encompass precisely the same intentional 
state. This is what Searle means when he says "the 
operation of the brain is causally sufficient for in-
tentionality, and that it is the operation of the brain 
and not the impact of the outside world that matters 
for the content of our intentional states, in at least 
one important sense of 'content'." I a In other words, 
even an isolated "brain in a vat" could have inten-
tional states involving trees or whatever, even though 
the assumed external cause of these states would not 
exist, i.e., the sight of a tree would not be due to a 
causal chain starting with an actual tree, proceeding 
through the eye and optic nerve, and ending in the ap-
propriate part of the brain. Instead, some other stim-
ulation of the brain itself would result in the appear-
ance of a "tree." It is the internal states of the 
brain (its intrinsic intentionality) that are impor-
tant, not the impingement of the causally related ex-
ternal world that those of us on the "outside" are 
aware of (observer-relative intentionality). 
From these few claims by Searle, and in what will 
follow, I will try to show that the following argument 
is consistent with what Searle does claim about inten-
tionality and the "causal powers of the brain." 
Because Searle does not specifically endorse this argu-
ment, I will refer to it hereafter as the "causal 
argument" and try to show that Searle's views support 
this argument. 
1. Having the same causal powers as the human brain 
is sufficient for having intentional states. 
2. If B (a non-human brain) exercises its causal 
powers in the very same way the human brain does 
then it will have the very same intentional 
states. 
3. For B to have the very same causal powers as the 
human brain is for its component parts to be 
capable of functioning in the same mechanistic 
way (or in a way analogous to) the component 
parts of the human brain. 
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4. The component parts of the human brain interact 
causally via the passage of biochemical electri-
cal currents. This is the mechanism which un-
derlies the causal interactions of the human 
brain. 
So, 5. B will have the same intentional states as a 
human brain only if its component parts interact 
electrically in a way analogous to the way the 
parts of the human brain do. 1 9 
The first premise is supported by, the above com-
ments made by Searle. If the brain, in fact, has in-
tentional states based on certain "causal powers," then 
if something has these same powers, it has the poten-
tial for intentional states. The second premise, in 
turn, is merely a claim as to the exercising of 
potential. If anything has the potential for inten-
tional states because it has the same powers as the 
human brain, then if it exercises these powers in the 
same way as the human brain, it will have intentional 
states. 
The third premise is perhaps the most controver-
sial. Fortunately, Searle does make some mention of 
what a claim like this could mean. It should be ap-
parent that Searle is not claiming that carbon-based 
biochemical entities are the only ones capable of in-
tentional states. That is, "any system that produced 
mental states would have to have powers equivalent to 
those of the brain. Such a system might use a dif-
ferent chemistry, but whatever its chemistry it would 
have to be able to cause what the brain causes." 2 0 
Thus, an entity with a copper-based biochemistry or 
even an entity with a non-biological structure could 
possess intentional states, as long as it has the same 
causal powers as the human brain. This leaves open the 
possibility of computers having intentional states, 
which Searle admits. He states, "perhaps its (the 
computer's or the computer's microchips) electrical 
properties can reproduce some of the actual causal pow-
ers of the electro-chemical features of the brain in 
producing mental states." 2 1 To clarify this position, 
consider the following thought-experiment. 
Suppose that the technology is available to 
separate all the individual neurons of a human brain 
while maintaining their electro-chemical relations with 
all the other neurons. 2 2 In this way, all the causal 
relations and connections of a normal brain are 
preserved. Now, suppose that we can create silicon mi-
crochips that can exactly re-create the input/output 
relations that are normal for the synapses of a single 
neuron. 2 1 Therefore, if a neuron in the extended brain 
is damaged, it can be replaced with a microchip that is 
precisely matched to that particular neuron. The chip 
will still causally interact with the biochemical neu-
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rons because the input/output changes it experiences 
will result in an alteration of its internal electro-
magnetic characteristics. Now, imagine further that 
every neuron in the extended brain is replaced with a 
microchip, after each microchip has been turned to 
match the input/output functions of its respective 
neuron. I think Searle woul accept this situation as 
possible, as well as being one that retains the inten-
tional states of the original biochemical brain. This 
acceptance is based on the fact that the actual causal 
relations are still intact, even though they are now 
realized in an electro-magnetic structure instead of an 
electro-chemical structure. That this might be possi-
ble is consistent with the causal argument and with 
Searle's position since he claims that, "[o|n my ac-
count it is a testable empirical claim whether in 
repairing a damaged brain we could duplicate the elec-
trochemical basis of intentionality using some other 
substance, say silicon." 2* 
Searle would not, however, accept the following 
argument. Given the manner in which certain microchips 
are constructed, we can always write a formal program 
that can stimulate the same formal processes that ob-
tain within the microchip. We can simulate a "gate" 
within the chip as being "open" or "closed" by the use 
of '0' and '1' respectively, in our program. 
Furthermore, a sequence in the chip that takes in three 
electrical "impulses" of strength x and gives out two 
"impulses" of strength y could be represented in a pro-
gram as an equation of the form 3x=}2y. Therefore, we 
could in principle write a program that would formally 
represent all of the relations that obtain within the 
chip. But this is the unacceptable move for the fol-
lowing reasons. First, this move takes the actual, 
physical states of the chips and describes or re-
presents them using some formal symbolism. Second, Ned 
Block makes somewhat the same point in a different 
context 2• and argues that what is happening is that 
such an approach virtually eliminates the importance of 
the "primitive processors" in the brain and focuses in-
stead on the formal description or re-presentation of 
the processes generated by these processors. In either 
case, we end up with a syntax without semantics. As 
Searle suggests, "if the simulation of the causes (of 
intentional states) is at a low enough level to repro-
duce the causes (as with the microchip or "primitive 
processor") and not merely describe them (as in a 
program), the 'simulation' will reproduce the 
effects." 2' Thus, we can see that the notion of func-
tioning in the same mechanistic way as the human brain 
is liberal enough to admit non-carbon-based neurophysi-
ology and yet narrow enough to exclude all the things 
(anthills, bunches of beer cans, etc.) which can only 
instantiate a digital computer program. 
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The fourth premise is basically an empirical claim 
to the effect that the mechanism of the human brain is 
biological and electro-chemical in nature. 
The conclusion of this argument follows from the 
premises as interpreted above. The notion of having to 
interact electrically in a way analogous to the human 
brain has been addressed in the discussion of premise 
three. However, this conclusion might be more conserva-
tive than is necessary. That is, it seems conceivable 
that an entity could exist whose component mental parts 
interact magnetically or optically, and we would still 
want to claim that if they had the appropriate causal 
powers, they would also have intentionality. It seems 
apparent, however, that if we can admit electro-
magnetic interaction to replace electro-chemical in-
teraction, then we could also admit magnetic and opti-
cal interaction without any serious harm to the 
argument. We would still be able to exclude digital 
computers based on magnetics or optics that only in-
stantiate programs because it would still be an empiri-
cal question as to whether such a system could, in 
fact, reproduce causal powers like those in the human 
brain. In this way, the above interpretaion of the 
causal argument based on Searle's various claims admits 
what it seems reasonable to admit to the class of 
"things with intentional states" while excluding all 
those things that were shown to be inadmissable by vir-
tue of Searle's demon. 
Ill 
CONCLUSIONS 
This discussion has been an attempt to expose the 
pertinent characteristics of the two views being 
considered. The difference between the two ultimately 
turns on how the brain can be the focus of intentional 
states. For the researchers in strong AI, the brain 
produces intentional states in virtue of its instantia-
tion of formal programs. For Searle, the brain pro-
duces intentionality in virtue of its causal powers and 
properties. As mentioned above, the difference seems 
to have its source in the relative priority being 
placed on the "primitive processors" and the processes 
as represented by programs. 
For the researcher in strong AI, the "primitive 
processor" (the brain's neurophysiology) is of no im-
portance as can be seen in what can be called a 
"digital computer." Instead, the researchers are exa-
mining the mental processes by questioning and observ-
ing human beings in action. From what they observe, 
they construct a formal program that can take the same 
symbolic input (words) as the brain qua person, and 
gives back the same output (words) as the brain qua 
person. Their claim is that if this is done with ade-
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guate attention to detail, the program created and in-
stantiated in any capable mechanism must achieve the 
same cognitive states as those observed by the resear-
chers in human subjects. Searle claims this is a gross 
error because the neurophysiology of the brain is not 
irrelevant to the analysis of intentional states. 
Furthermore, since the researchers are (so to speak) on 
the outside looking in, their ascribing of intentional-
ity to the computer instantiating the program is merely 
a case of observer-relative intentionality. The causal 
argument has shown that intrinsic intentionality is ex-
posed by an empirical examination to determine whether 
the entity in question possesses the appropriate causal 
powers. But for the researcher in strong AI, the for-
mal relations and structures are constructed through 
observation and theory, and the data (uninterpreted 
symbols for the computer, interpreted as words by the 
researchers) is fitted into this structure. The formal 
structure precedes the data being related. If you 
will, the syntax is created by the researchers prior to 
the semantics, the semantics which never arrives. This 
is what happens, according to the causal argument, when 
the formal descriptions of human behavior capable of 
instantiation by digital computer are given priority 
over the actual, physical primitive processors that 
make up the human brain. 
According to the causal argument, the perspective 
and the priority are just the opposite. The intrinsic 
intentionality of the brain is realized in virtue of 
the causal relations that exist between the primitive 
processors of the brain. Whatever the precise causal 
characteristics of the brain are (however the brain 
acutally works), they are sufficient to produce inten-
tional states. These characteristics cannot exist 
soley in the formal, observer-described relations re-
presented in the structure of the brain, so it must be 
something mechanistically inherent to the brain (but 
not tied to its particular biochemistry) that accounts 
for the presence of intentional states. In the causal 
argument, the primitive processors entering into these 
formal relations exist prior to the relations. 
Consequently, we must give priority to these primitive 
processors rather than to the formal relations we 
recognize (after the fact). In this case, the seman-
tics exists before the "observed" syntax. 
In summary, the relevant difference between the 
position of strong AI and the causal argument is that 
the former is based on the formal structure of programs 
that turn out to be empty of anything to relate and the 
latter is based on the causal relation and character-
istics of the brain which at this point we know to be 
sufficient for intentional states, but which may at 
this time be indescribable beyond their being mechan-
istically grounded. For Searle, the'formal relations 
that obtain and are recognized by strong AI (according 
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to our observer-relative analysis) only serve a purpose 
in virtue of their ability to describe certain formal 
mental relationships. They cannot, however, tell us 
anything about the actual, physical, causal properties 
of the brain which are the most fundamental source of 
human intentional states. For this, we must do brain 
physiology. 
In conclusion, there can be little doubt that 
Searle's positive position is both difficult to present 
and subtle in the distinctions it draws. However, we 
have seen that there is a relevant difference between 
the causal argument and the view of strong AI and that 
the causal argument can be maintained while the thesis 
of strong AI is rejected. I think that Searle's argu-
ment against strong AI is indubitable. Furthermore, 
his positive view, as represented in the causal argu-
ment, is certainly prima facie plausible. And if we 
take Searle seriously when he claims that, "(ijf you 
want to build a machine to produce mental states, then 
it cannot be designed to do so soley in virtue of its 
instantiating of a certain computer program, but must 
have (causal) powers equivalent to those of the 
brain," 2 7 then I think it is more reasonable to embrace 
Searle's view than to suspend judgment. I think we 
should accept the causal argument analysis of inten-
tionality. 
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(hereafter abbrev. MBP) 
3John Searle, "The Myth of the Computer," The New 
York Review of Books, April 29, 1982, 3-6 (hereafter 
abbrev. MC) 
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'Searle, MBP, p. 417. 
•Searle, MC, p. 5. 
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1 0John Heil, "Does Cognitive Psychology Rest on a 
Mistake?," Mind, 90: p. 331 (1981). 
"Searle, MBP, p. 451. It should be noted that 
this use of intrinsic and observer-relative intention-
ality may very well seem to open a Pandora's box as far 
as the question of how we can ever really know that 
some entity has intrinsic intentionality. However, 
since the causal argument will show that the notion of 
"causal powers" is an empirical question, this should 
not concern us here. 
"Briefly, these replies are as follows. The 
Systems Reply claims that Searle's demon is merely a 
part of a larger system, and that the system as a whole 
does understand Chinese, even if Searle's demon does 
not. The Robot Reply asks that we change the program 
and put the computer in control of a robot such that 
the robot would receive inputs from various sources and 
send them to the computer. The computer outputs would, 
in turn, operate the robot in actions of walking, eat-
ing, speaking, etc. Such a robot would be capable of 
genuine understanding. The Brain Simulator Reply asks 
us to change the approach to the problem. The program 
to be developed does not use scripts about the world, 
but instead it simulates the actual sequence of neural 
firings in the brain of a Chinese speaker when he has 
Chinese stories as inputs and gives out Chinese 
answers. At this level, what could be the difference 
between the program of the computer and the program of 
the Chinese brain? The Combination Reply merely asks 
us to consider in one combined situation, the previous 
three responses. 
"Searle, MBP, p. 451. 
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Arnold Zuboff's "The Story of a Brain," in The Mind's 
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2 JFor the current ideas about the possibility of 
creating such microchips see: Ernest Kent, The Brains 
of Men and Machines, (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 
1981). See especially chapters 1-4. 
"Searle, MBP, p. 453. It should also be noted 
that this position seems to draw the distinction 
between an analog computer and a digital computer. If 
these microchips were indeed constructed, they would be 
analog devices because they operate electro-
magnetically in a manner analogous to the electrochemi-
cal operations of the neuron. Thus, Searle can admit 
that an analog computer of sufficient complexity could 
have intentional states, since this is precisely what 
the extended brain described above has become. 
1 4Ned Block, "Occasional Paper #22: Mental 
Pictures and Cognitive Science," Center for Cognitive 
Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
Cambridge, Mass. (1982). In this paper, Block is 
concerned with the cognitive science interpretation of 
the pictorial and descriptive analyses of mental 
imagery. What is relevant here is that Block concludes 
that even cognitive scientists of the sort who would 
embrace strong AI must accept that there are primitive 
processors which cannot be described by representa-
tions, but must be explained nomologically (see p. 26). 
Consequently, the question becomes one of which is more 
crucial, the representational descriptions or the prim-
itive processors. Block claims that we must place much 
more emphasis on the primitive processors as analog 
devices (pp. 39-41); and that is the same point Searle 
is trying to make, even more fervently, when he says we 
cannot ignore the neurophysiology of the brain in favor 
of formal programs alone. 
"Searle, MBP, p. 453. 
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